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The year 1918 saw the last battles of the First World War. The millions of casualties 
and the destabilisation of the societies of both the defeated and the victorious pow-
ers raised the issue of a radical social change. Russia had collapsed, and the Commu-
nist Party members assumed power in the ongoing civil war, appealing to their ide-
ological allies for a common approach to the organisation of a world revolution. In 
this period, the Czechoslovak and British sections of the Communist International 
(Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPC] and Communist Party of Great Britain 
[CPGB]) emerged. During the 1920s, they gradually established themselves in the po-
litical field of their nation-states and sought to rally supporters for a revolutionary 
change through the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat.
It is scarcely possible to imagine more different conditions for the functioning of 
a Communist Party within the European Communist movement. Great Britain was 
a world imperialist power, the cradle of the industrial revolution and capitalism as 
such, while newly emerging Czechoslovakia had been until recently a part of the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy, a monarchy without a colonial influence, where the 
industrial revolution was going hand in hand with the establishment of modern capi-
talism, and lagged far behind Great Britain.1 Britain had become not only the cradle 
of capitalism, but also of an ideology based on the premise of its systemic unsustain-
ability. The canonical works of Marxism were based on empirical experience of the 
functioning of British society. Karl Marx wrote The Capital in the British Museum 
study rooms.2 Friedrich Engels was so shocked by the poverty of workers in his fa-
ther’s factory that it spurred him to write an influential book, The Condition of the 
1 Cf. David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus. Technological change and industrial devel-
opment in Western Europe from 1750 to the present, Cambridge 1969, pp. 41–123; Edward 
P. Thompson, The Making of English Working Class, London 2013 with Otto Urban, Kapi-
talismus a česká společnost: k otázkám formování české společnosti v 19. století, Prague 
2003 or Jaroslav Purš, Průmyslová revoluce: vývoj pojmu a koncepce, Prague 1973. 




Working Class in England.3 When Lenin compiled the famous pamphlet Imperialism, the 
Highest Stage of Capitalism, he had been influenced by an analysis of British imperial-
ism penned by J. A. Hobson.4 
The Communist Manifesto clearly declares a direct causal nexus between the de-
gree of capitalist development achieved in a given society and the development of 
a revolutionary situation. Interwar Britain was still regarded, despite the exacerbat-
ing economic problems, as the workshop of the world. It was certainly much closer 
than the young Czechoslovakia to a Socialist revolution, viewed from the Marxist 
perspective, in terms of the development of capitalist production relations and im-
perial domination. The British Communists, who had fully accepted the ideological 
imperatives, saw their society as being ripe for a revolution. In their 1924 manifesto 
they said: “Great Britain is the oldest of the capitalist powers. Its economic organisa-
tion is most ripe for the transition to socialism. The centralisation and trustification 
of industry and banking are highly developed and ready for socialist ownership and 
control with minimal dislocation.”5 The Czechoslovak Communists shared this enthu-
siasm, declaring that the fall of capitalism was inevitable.6 The difference consisted in 
society’s willingness to participate in the revolutionary project. While CPC was able 
to stabilise its membership with 138 996 members by the year 1924, CPGB had only 
4 371 members.7 The parliamentary elections in 1925 made CPC with a gain of 931 769 
votes the second strongest political party in the state. The British Communist Party 
did not have more than one deputy in the whole time span who would have been 
elected directly for CPGB.8 
Robert Roberts, an inhabitant of the working-class quarter of Salford in Manches-
ter, whose milieu was strongly influenced by Engels’ work, remembered: “Marxist 
ranters from the Hall who paid fleeing visits to our street end insisted that we, prole-
tariat, stood locked in titanic struggle with some wicked master class […] most people 
passed by; a few stood to listen, but not for long: the problems of proletariat, they 
felt, had little to do with them.”9 By contrast, Communists entered the working-class 
slums around Prague without much trouble to build their power base there.10 The de-
3 Friedrich Engels, Postavení dělnické třídy v Anglii, Prague 1950; see also Steven Marcus, 
Engels, Manchester and the Working Class, London 1974.
4 Vladimir I. Lenin, Imperialismus jako nejvyšší stádium kapitalismu, Prague 1949, p. 15.
5 Draft Programme of the CPGB. To the Comintern, The Communist Review, June 1924, 
Vol. 5, No. 2. 
6 In 1925 one of the magazines close to CPC stated: “We watch all this through the eyes of 
a doctor who is content because he sees his diagnosis is correct: all the symptoms of a dis-
ease are present. We say the capitalist order is dying…” see Výboj 15. 5. 1925.
7 Cf. Jacques Rupnik, Dějiny Komunistické strany Československa. Od počátků do převzetí 
moci, Prague 2002, p. 85, with Andrew Thorpe, The Membership of the Communist Par-
ty of Great Britain, 1920–1945, The Historical Journal 43, 2000, no. 3, p. 781.
8 Andrew Thorpe, The British Communist Party and Moscow, 1920–1943, Manchester 2000, p. 7.
9 Robert Roberts, The Classic Slum. Salford Life in the First Quarter of the Century, Man-
chester 1971, p. 14.
10 Bohumil Melichar, Rudá Praha. O příčinách volební úspěšnosti meziválečné KSČ, Master’s 




scribed discrepancy between the expectations of the theoreticians of the Communist 
movement and the real power of CPBG, as well as the notable success of CPC, which 
would probably have surprised the creators of the Marxist ideology, brings up the fol-
lowing set of questions before the scholars: 1) Was a failure or success due to a differ-
ent party organisation or movement tactics in the public space? 2) To what extent did 
the differing structure of the political field11 in Czechoslovakia and in Great Britain af-
fect the possibilities of success of a radical leftist revolutionary programme? 3) What 
ensured the great stability of British society and, conversely, in what way did the 
stabilising factors in the young Czechoslovakia fail? The last of the questions seems to 
be crucial. Finding reasons for the success of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 
in comparison with an unsuccessful movement, and a society highly resistant to left 
and right radicalism, could yield a significant contribution to the debate over the suc-
cessful establishment of the Socialist regime after 1945.
The way to answering these scholarly questions is to perform a synchronous, in-
dividualising comparative analysis in the study of selected political entities. These 
are ideal research subjects because they are equivalent in both their goals and the 
ideological sources of the strategy and tactics used in moving in the political field that 
they received from the Moscow Centre of the 3rd International.12 Already, when draw-
ing a superficial comparison between the reality of interwar Britain and Czechoslo-
vakia, the simple interpretative schemes collapse. The living standard of most of 
the working class members in Britain was not higher than that in Czechoslovakia, 
education was just as socially impenetrable, socially excluded areas surrounded ma-
jor cities and industrial areas, and the unemployed had during the Great Depression 
a similar experience in the British Isles and in the centre of Europe.13 It turns out that 
11 The field in which the competitive struggle between the political parties took place fits the 
definition of Pierre Bourdieu: “A field of power is a space for power relations between dif-
ferent forms of capital, or endowed with one of different forms of capital to such a degree 
that they can control its field and be ready to fight whenever the relative value of those 
forms of capital is endangered.” Although Bourdieu excluded political reality from this 
scheme, it can be said that in the case of an interwar political arena those actors are indi-
vidual political parties who tried through their activities to protect and increase in rela-
tive value a certain form of capital held by their members or voters. See Pierre Bourdieu, 
Teorie jednání, Prague 1998, p. 39. For definitions of different forms of capital see Pierre 
Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital. In: John Richardson (eds.), Handbook of theory and re-
search for the sociology of education, New York 1986.
12 Concerning the theory of comparative approach in historiography see Milan Scholz, Kom-
parativní přístup v historiografii a transnacionální historická problematika, Sociální stu-
dia. Fakulta sociálních studií Masarykovy university 1/ 2009, pp. 71–75; Jürgen Kocka, 
Comparison and Beyond, History and Theory, Vol. 42, No. 1 Feb., 2003, p. 40, and The-
da Skocpol — Margaret Somers, The Use of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1980).
13 As for the living standard of the lower classes and possibilities of their members’ social ad-
vance cf. Ross McKibbin, Classes and Cultures. England 1918–1951, Oxford 1958, pp. 100, 
207, 235–269; Eric Hopkins, A Social History of the English Working Classes 1815–1945, 




a direct comparison between the suffering of the working class and the success of the 
radical left does not suffice to advance an adequate explanation. 
PARALELL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE WINGS OF THE COMINTERN 
The bloody battles in the trenches of the First World War and their outcome in the 
emergence of the Bolshevik regime in Russia, triggered, as has already been said in 
the introduction, a change in the worldwide workers’ movement. Both in Czecho-
slovakia and in Britain this represented a fundamental experience for the radicali-
sation of the left and the material misery of society in the rear, and the battles that 
devoured a whole generation of young men. The British radical left staged its revolt 
against the Labour Party leadership during heavy arms industry strikes and protest 
actions against army recruitment. By the end of the war, Czechoslovakia was shaken 
by hunger strikes involving looting of shops and stopping work in key operations for 
the war effort.14 Growing trade union organisation manifested from the 1890s and the 
parallel bloating of trade union bureaucracy resulted in an expansion of their lead-
ers’ influence. The nature of the central management of the British industry during 
the war, where the unions played an important role in the coordination of the war ef-
fort, further increased their influence. While the leadership of the trade unions tried 
to retain loyalty towards the state authorities, the protest potential of the member-
ship increased at the local level. The strikes and demonstrations were being led by the 
Shop Stewards Movement, striving to tackle their supporters’ problems through di-
rect action, along with such radical British organisations as British Socialist Party, So-
cialist League, Socialist Labour Party, and Independent Labour Party, which brought 
together the left-pacifist wing of the Labour Party. These formations and their sup-
porters enthusiastically welcomed the October Revolution in 1917. The members of 
Socialist Labour Party even called themselves “British Bolsheviks”’. In Britain, there 
were 35 000 direct-action activists, while the Labour Party said its top priority was to 
prevent Russia from making a separate peace.15
In Czechoslovakia the initiative was seized by the National Committee and the 
course of events led to the proclamation of an independent republic. The members 
of the Socialist Council (including the future leader of the Communist Party Bohumír 
Šmeral), who had played an important role in the organisation of strikes and unrest 
before the declaration of independence, also took part in the activities of the Commit-
a každodennost pražského dělnictva v meziválečné době, Plzeň 2009. Concerning the ex-
perience of unemployment cf. George Orwell, Down and Out in Paris and London, Lon-
don 1989 (original 1933), pp. 134–230; George Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier, London 
1937, with Jakub Rákosník, Odvrácená tvář meziválečné prosperity. Nezaměstnanost 
v Československu v letech 1918–1938, Prague 2008, pp. 407–410.
14 See for example Richard Hyman, Rank-and-File Movements and Workplace Organisa-
tion, 1914–1939. In: A History of British Industrial Relations 1914–1939, Vol. II, Sussex 1987, 
pp. 132–140.




tee.16 The combined efforts of the entire political spectrum to build a nation-state kept 
the left formally unified but within the Czechoslovak Social Democrats the pressures 
exerted by young activists born in 1885–1900 who were campaigning for a Socialist 
Czechoslovakia intensified.17 One of them, Marie Švermová, recalled how the news of 
the Bolshevik Revolution affected her: “To us, the youth, the proletarian revolution 
meant a solution to all the problems. We saw in it the fullest sense of our lives. We 
heard how the workers and peasants took power in Russia. It is no exaggeration to 
say that we were determined to sacrifice everything [...].”18 The activists on the other 
side of Europe had a very similar experience. Rajani Palme Dutt had himself declared 
fit to join the army at his own request so that he could then demonstratively refuse 
to begin his military service, for which he was expelled from Oxford and sentenced 
to six months in prison.19 William Gallacher organised strikes and demonstrations 
in the Clyde region and Harry Pollitt enthusiastically distributed Lenin’s Appeal to 
the Toiling Masses in London docks. 20 Tom Wintringham embraced Communism as 
a result of direct experience of trench warfare, an experience shared with Antonín 
Zápotocký and Klement Gottwald.21 
The motivations of the activists to take up the idea of a world revolution and the 
practice of protest basically tallied. Whilst Harry Pollitt and others convinced Lon-
don’s port workers not to load war materiel on the British Expedition Corps ships as 
part of the “Hands Off Russia” campaign, Czechoslovak activists organised a boycott 
on loading war supplies on trains going to the Polish Army fighting the Bolshevik in-
tervention.22 But, the process of establishing Communist parties was totally different. 
In Britain, negotiations began in 1919 between the leaders of the following small radi-
cal Marxist political groups: British Socialist Party, Socialist Labour Party, Workers’ 
Socialist Federation, South Wales Socialist Society, representatives of the Shop Stew-
ards Movement, and Independent Labour Party. The negotiations over the acceptance 
of 21 Comintern conditions were protracted but eventually led to the adoption of the 
Communist Unity Convention and the manifesto “Call for Communist Party”.23 The 
16 With regard to the socialist council and its participants see for example Jan Galandauer, 
Bohumír Šmeral 1914–1941, Prague 1986, pp. 177–183.
17 Lukáš Fasora, Stáří k poradě, mládí k boji. Radikalizace mladé generace českých socialistů 
1900–1920, Brno 2015, pp. 137–200.
18 Marie Švermová, Vzpomínky, Prague 2008, p. 39.
19 John Callaghan, Rajani Palme Dutt. A Study in British Stalinism, London 1993, pp. 9–18.
20 William Gallacher, Revolt on the Clyde, London 1936; Kevin Morgan, Harry Pollitt, Man-
chester 1993, pp. 14–20.
21 Cf. Hugh Purcell, The Last English Revolutionary. Tom Wintringham 1898–1949, Sutton 
2004, pp. 1–17, with Karel Kaplan, Kronika komunistického Československa: Klement 
Gottwald a Rudolf Slánský, Prague 2009, pp. 7–12.
22 Cf. Mary Davis, Comrade or Brother? A History of the British Labour Movement, London 
1993, pp. 155–157; Francis Beckett, Enemy Within. The Rise and Fall of the British Com-
munist Party, London 1998, p. 11, with Martin Nechvátal, 15. 5. 1921 — založení KSČ: ve 
službách Kominterny, Prague 2002, p. 20.
23 James Klugmann, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, Vol I., Formation and 




establishment of CPC, on the other hand, resulted in a serious rift within the Social 
Democratic Party. Young activists belonging to the same generation as the found-
ers of the British Communist Party urged older left-wing politicians to totally break 
with the reformist past. The conflict lines around accepting the Comintern conditions 
overlapped with the rejection of participation in the government in a coalition with 
the right-wing Agrarian Party, and the defence of the newly-created state against the 
advance of the army of the Soviet Republic of Hungary in the territory of Slovakia. 
The radical left organised a general strike in December 1920, and the situation quickly 
escalated to a struggle over the party assets in what became known as the struggle 
for People’s House (the seat of Social Democracy). The call for the December general 
strike led in Kladno and central Bohemia to workers’ sit-ins in the factories, and in 
Prague and other places clashes erupted with police units. In January 1921, Social 
Democratic Youth adopted the ECI’s conditions and established the Communist Youth 
Union. In March 1921, the so-called Kladno Comrades, activists arrested for agitation 
during the general strike in Kladno went on trial, including the top left-wing leader 
Antonín Zápotocký and editor Alois Muna, who essentially became a collective repre-
sentation of the resistance of the Communists against the new republic. In May 1921, 
the Communist Party was established.24 
The fundamental difference between the newly established CPC and CPGB lay in 
the size of these political parties. While CPGB brought together 5 125 activists after 
its founding, and its membership fell to 3 906 by the end of 1921, CPC enticed most of 
the members of the Social Democrats to its newly-built structures, leaving the lat-
ter in a programme vacuum.25 At the local level, the Social Democratic organisations 
were simply renamed as Communist, and opponents of the new policy were simply 
expelled.26 The first chairman of the Communist Party, during the current split, esti-
mated that the left represented 350 000 members, and throughout the 1920s the party 
managed to keep 90 000–150 000 members.27 
During the 1920s, both sides sought to gain a place in the political field of their 
nation societies and to establish a major party capable of revolutionising the work-
24 See Martin Nechvátal, 15. 5. 1921 — založení KSČ: ve službách Kominterny, Prague 2002.
25 The Social Democracy was traditionally protected against a schism caused by Marxist ide-
ology influenced by revisionist historians. The conflict resulted in search of a programme 
alternative towards the politics of CPC. The search for this alternative lasted through-
out the 1920s. This did not mean the party lost political influence. On the contrary, it 
participated in most coalition governments formed in interwar Czechoslovakia. As for 
the programme debates see Martin Polášek, Revizionisté, progresivisté a tradicionalis-
té. Programové debaty v Československé sociální demokracii v letech 1924–1938, Brno 
2013; and Jan Kuklík, Hledání cesty k demokratickému socialismu. K programovému 
vývoji Československé sociálně demokratické strany dělnické v první polovině 30. let. 
In: Zdeněk Kárník (ed.), K novověkým sociálním dějinám českých zemí, Vol. III, Od války 
k válce 1914–1939, Prague 1998.
26 An example is given in the memoirs of a member of the Prague organisation. See Vzpo-
mínka Marie Bajerové, Strana nás dovedla k vítězství. Vzpomínky komunistů, Prague 
1961, p. 25.




ing class. Representatives of the Comintern followed the Marxist theory axioms and 
declared successful expansion of the British Communists’ influence as one of the 
priorities. This went hand in hand with material support for the British movement. 
Francis Beckett goes so far in his study as to claim that “without Lenin’s continuous 
encouragement, and the careful distribution of Soviet money among groups that had 
always been starved of funds, the Communist Party would not have existed.”28 With 
the help of this money, the party began building a party structure from local organ-
isations and factory cells to the top of the party, and maintained close contact with 
representatives of the Comintern.29 As for organisation, both parties essentially em-
braced the same principles.30 While there are no hard data on the level of CPC fund-
ing by the Comintern, it can be said that CPGB is likely to have received much more 
assistance per member. The Czechoslovak Communists successfully built a network 
of parallel organisations around the main body of the political party, bringing to-
gether children, youth, women and leftist intellectual circles.31 The British proceeded 
in a similar way, and in response to high postwar unemployment, they gained an 
indirect influence over Wal Hannington’s National Unemployed Workers Committee 
Movement (NUWM), which became a particularly important mobilising force in the 
1930s.32 Shortly after the establishment of CPGB, its youth organisation Young Com-
munist League was founded and directly linked through William Rust to the party 
leadership.33
In 1924, a pro-Communist trade union organisation, National Minority Movement 
(NMM) directly funded by CPGB was established and it gained considerable influence 
in 1926. After the re-adoption of the gold standard the situation of the British heavy 
and textile industry that had been in trouble before aggravated so much that large-
scale redundancies were to take place. The strong British unions opposed this mea-
sure. In May 1926, they called a general strike and paralysed the country. Hundreds 
of thousands of workers took to the streets of industrial cities, and the peace was 
kept by policemen in armoured vehicles. The strike was called off after nine days.34 
28 F. Beckett, Enemy Within, p. 16,
29 Concerning the degree of influence of the CPGB by the Comintern organs and frequency 
of personal and mediated contacts see Andrew Thorpe, The British Communist Party and 
Moscow, 1920–1943, Manchester 2000.
30 Cf. for example Handbook on Local Organisation, London [1922]; Národní archiv Praha 
[National Archive Prague, hereinafter as NA Prague], fund (hereinafter as f.) ÚV KSČ, kra-
jské oddělení Praha, box (hereinafter as b.) 2, Organizační zpráva ke konferenci I. kraje 
KSČ konané 13. 9. 1925. 
31 B. Melichar, Rudá Praha, pp. 28–37.
32 Matt Perry, Bread and Work. Social Policy and the Experience of Unemployment, London 
2000, pp. 104–117, and James Eaden — David Renton, The Communist Party of Great Brit-
ain since 1920, New York, 2002, p. 13,
33 Andrew Flinn, William Rust: The Comintern’s Blue-Eyed Boy?. In: Kevin Morgan and Alan 
Campbell (eds.), Party People. Communist Lives. Explorations in Biography, John McIlroy, 
London 2001, pp. 81–83. 
34 See J. R. Florey, The General Strike of 1926. The Economic, Political and Social Causes of that 




However, miners from the most problematic areas refused to go back to work and 
continued the strike for nine months.35 During this period, both CPGB and NMM re-
cruited new members and the public discourse was dominated by warnings against 
a Bolshevik coup. During the trade unions’ crisis talks with the employers twelve 
CPGB leaders were arrested before the start of the strike, and hundreds of activists 
were arrested during the strike.36 The NMM leaders demanded transformation of the 
strike Councils of Action into Soviets and nationalisation of the industry. The editors 
of the Communist press and the authors of the pamphlets interpreted the events as 
follows: “[...] the British working class has entered into a new era, the era of mass 
struggle which can only culminate in an open revolutionary struggle.”37 The calling 
off of the strike was interpreted as a betrayal of Labour and of the traditional struc-
tures of the British trade unions. The British Communist Party recruited six thousand 
new members at the time of the strike, doubling its membership.
The Czechoslovak Communists dreamed of organising a general strike after the 
adoption of the so-called New Strike Strategy promoted since 1929 by representatives 
of the Red Union International.38 In 1929, the leadership of the pro-Communist In-
ternational All-Trade Union Association (IAUA) was expelled after refusing to subor-
dinate the wage and other demands of the workers to strictly political goals leading 
to zero cooperation with other trade unions. This was followed by an attempt to call 
for a point-blank refusal of forced labour, which was to begin in the North Bohemian 
textile area.39 This campaign came to nothing but whereas the strikes all but ceased 
in Britain in the 1930s, the Czechoslovak Communist activists tried to lead political 
strikes until 1934.40 The radicalisation of CPC’s progress in Labour-capital conflicts was 
the Battle for Public Opinion in Interwar Britain, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 82, 
No.  1 (March 2010) and Morris Margaret, The General Strike, Harmondsworth 1976.
35 With respect to motivations and functioning of the miners’ community during the strike 
see this case study by Hester Barron, The 1926 Miners Lockout. Meanings of Community 
in the Durham Coalfield, Oxford 2010. 
36 The Communist Party on Trial. W. M. Gallacher’s Defence and Judge Rigby Swift’s Sum-
ming-up, London [1925]. The 1925 trial was commented by J. T. Murphy in his article 
Straight from the Docks: cit. J. T. Murphy, Straight from the Docks, Workers’ Weekly, 4 De-
cember 1925. James Eden states that during the strike 25% of the members of CPGB were 
arrested. See James Eaden — David Renton, The Communist Party of Great Britain since 
1920, New York, 2002, pp. 24–30.
37 Rajani Palme Dutt, The First British General Strike, The Communist International. Or-
gan of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, London, No. 21, 1926, 
pp. 3–36 — also published as a pamphlet R. Palme Dutt, The Meaning of the General 
Strike, London 1926.
38 International press correspondence 20. 12. 1929, reprint of speech by E. Thällman and 
A. Lozovsky at 10th plenary session of Executive Committee of the Communist Interna-
tional.
39 Jan Mlynárik, Nová štrajková stratégia a  štrajk severočeských textilákov roku 1929, 
Československý časopis historický 1966, pp. 703–727. 





part of the changes brought about by the introduction of the tactics of “class against 
class”. At the ninth plenary session of the ECI, a thesis regarding the early arrival of 
the final crisis of capitalism was approved, and the individual party sections called 
for the taking of immediate steps to eliminate the Social Democratic political rivals.41 
In 1929, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia underwent a radical generation 
change and its leadership now belonged to a generation that had been the source 
of youth radicalism since the founding of the party. The aim was, in line with the 
thesis of social-fascism, to get rid of the legacy of Social democracy inside the party. 
Between 1929 and 1930 more than 120 000 members were expelled from CPC due to 
the demand for radical activism to be met by each member. Similarly, the number of 
members of CPGB decreased since 1927.42 In this period, the ideal leader was a char-
ismatic, strong personality with a working-class background. Both CPGB and CPC 
followed in the election of their leader the wider trend of the whole international 
Communist movement when they elected as their leader’s ideal representatives of the 
Bolshevist Communist movement. While Klement Gottwald was an illegitimate son 
of an agricultural worker and trained carpenter, Harry Pollitt was the son of a textile 
worker and a blacksmith inclined to alcoholism. Pollitt began to gain work experience 
in Manchester factories at the age of 12.43 Both surrounded themselves with intellec-
tuals. The position of the second man in CPGB was held by an Oxford-educated doc-
tor’s son, Rajani Palme Dutt. The same rung was shared in CPC by university-educated 
son of lawyer Jan Šverma, and a graduate of a business academy Rudolf Slánský.44 
Whilst the purges in CPGB were relatively extensive, CPGB did not harbour any Social 
Democratic or Labour resentment due to the different process of party formation, 
and except for the retention of some members of the leadership and the departure of 
inactive members at the local level it did not undergo a similar generation change.45 
On the contrary, Pollitt’s leadership eventually succeeded in thwarting attempts by 
William Rust and his party faction, the Young Turks, the most vocal supporters of 
the Comintern line, to question the British interpretation of the class-to-class tactic. 
In the end, Rust left the party leadership in Lancashire in 1934.46 The sharp drop in 
CPGB’s membership figures was due to the gradual depletion of the protest energy of 
the participants in the general strike and miners’ lockout. 
After the changes in the leadership and in the party apparatus, both CPC and 
CPGB embodied all the defining attributes of a Bolshevist Communist Party. These 
41 The Programme of the Communist International Together with the Statutes of the Com-
munist International, London and Wembley 1929. See also Kevin McDermott and Jere-
my Agnew, Kominterna: dějiny mezinárodního komunismu za Leninovy a Stalinovy éry, 
Prague 2011, pp. 110–133.
42 Cf. J. Rupnik, Dějiny Komunistické strany, p. 85; A. Thorpe, The Membership, p. 781.
43 Cf. K. Morgan, Harry Pollitt, pp. 1–2 and K. Kaplan, Kronika komunistického Českosloven-
ska, p. 7.
44 Cf. J. Callaghan, Rajani Palme Dutt, pp. 9–18; and M. Švermová, Vzpomínky, p. 51; K. Kap-
lan, Kronika komunistického Československa, p. 207.
45 Cf. for example J. Rupnik, Dějiny Komunistické strany, pp. 90–98. 




were entities uncritically accepting ideological impulses from the centre of the Co-
mintern, dedicated to the defence of the Soviet Union and, last but not least, organ-
ised according to the principle of democratic centralism.47 However, the efforts to 
rigidly retain these positions led, together with the acceptation of the thesis about 
social-fascism, to growing isolation within the political field. A full marginalisation 
of CPC and the real collapse of CPGB were prevented by the opening of a new field 
of activity that ideologically fits into the Marxist scheme of gradual decay of capi-
talism. This field represented an unprecedented increase in unemployment. While 
NUWM was founded in the early 1920s, CPC built its movement of the unemployed 
in a natural way in response to the consequences of the economic crisis. Both CPC 
and NUWM linked to CPGB managed to fill the streets with hundreds to thousands 
of demonstrators in hunger marches.48 Clashes with law-enforcement agencies were 
not uncommon.
Despite certain achievements of the unemployed movement that both parties 
managed to maintain through their activism in the public space, it can be said that 
in 1929–1934 they lost much of their political influence. The 8th Comintern Congress 
held in 1935 brought about a change in the policy of both groups.49 Practical appli-
cation of the united front policy allowed for increased involvement of Communist 
activities within the entire left-wing political field. The isolation required by the 
radical class-against-class tactic undermined the ability of both British and Czecho-
slovak Communists to effectively act at the lowest level of party organisation, among 
the workers. Harry Pollitt engaged in a dispute not only with representatives of the 
Profintern, but also with the party ideologist R.P. Dutt in an attempt to preserve 
the work of the Communists within the Labour union affiliated with the Labour 
Party.50 By contrast, Gottwald and his colleagues were the butt of criticism from the 
Comintern representatives because of their involvement in the miners’ strike in the 
Most coal basin, where they supported the creation of a strike committee composed 
of several trade unions.51 It is not surprising, therefore, that neither CPGB nor CPC 
47 Brigitte Studer, Stalinization: Balance Sheet of a Complex Notion. In: Norman LaPorte, 
Kevin Morgan and Matthew Worley (eds.), Bolshevism, Stalinism and the Comintern. Per-
spectives on Stalinization, 1917–53, Basingstoke — New York 2008, pp. 49–50.
48 Cf. National Hunger Congress and March Council: Manifesto, London [1934]; M. Perry, 
Bread and Work, pp. 115–120, with Jakub Rákosník, Zásady ochrany a boje nezaměstnaných 
v kontextu programu KSČ. In: Zdeněk Kárník — Jiří Kocian — Jaroslav Pažout — Jakub 
Rákosník (eds.), Bolševismus, komunismus a radikální socialismus v Československu I., 
Prague 2003 and Květa Kořalková, Hnutí nezaměstnaných v Československu v  letech 
1929–1933, Prague 1962.
49 Repursuance of unified front policy within the Comintern structures see K. McDermott — 
J. Agnew, Kominterna, pp. 130–165, and extracts from the resolution of the seventh Comin-
tern Congress on the fascism, working-class unity, and the tasks of the Comintern. The Com-
munist International Documents, Vol. III. (1919–1943), Jane Degras (eds.), pp. 355–356, 361.
50 K. Morgan, Harry Pollitt, pp. 74–81; See also A. Thorpe, The British Communist Party, 
p. 192.
51 As for the Most strike see Zdeněk Kárník, České země v éře První republiky (1918–1938), 




mounted any vehement opposition to the adoption of the new political line of the 
united front.
The prime motive for changing the European Communist movement’s acting in 
the public space was to find an effective counterweight able to stop the rise of fascist 
political movements. Closer cooperation not only with the Social Democrats or the 
Labour Party, but also with left-wing intellectual circles, was to lead to the forma-
tion of a broad anti-fascist coalition, primarily based on the defence of the exist-
ing democratic institutions, and only in the subsequent phase of their destruction 
in the implementation of Socialism. Both CPGB and CPC took the view that fascism 
is a dictatorship of millionaires and an expression of the last phase of monopoly 
capitalism.52 While the Communists in Britain engaged in violent street clashes with 
Mosley’s British Union of Fascists and attracted intellectuals from G.B. Shaw to liberal 
Anglican bishops emphasising the positive aspects of life in the USSR, the Czechoslo-
vak Communists demonstrated with slogans demanding protection of the democratic 
republic against a fascist threat.53 Help for democratic Spain was one of the top pri-
orities for CPC and CPGB because it was a practical tangible application of the People’s 
Front. Both groupings raised funds and collected material for the Republican regime 
and actively recruited volunteers for the International Brigades. CPGB and the Young 
Communist League sent to the civil war fronts 1 105 of a total of 2 300 British volun-
teers. CPC sent via Europe 2 200 Czechoslovak citizens and moreover, its structures 
functioned as interchange stations for volunteers from the neighbouring Central and 
Eastern European states.54 While CPGB’s anti-fascist line gained considerable popu-
larity in the late 1930s, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia which emphasised 
class identity and internationalism was banned in the second Czechoslovak Republic 
and subsequently faced severe persecution by the Protectorate security forces. After 
1945, the party structures working underground under the pressure of repressive 
forces were renewed by leaders returning from Moscow or London exile. As a result 
of its interwar successes and active resistance against the Nazi regime, the Commu-
nist Party became a force capable of taking power in the postwar era.
It follows from the foregoing that the two comparable political parties experi-
enced very similar developments in the period under review. This finding is not sur-
52 Cf. The Programme of the Communist Party adopted at the XIII Congress February 2nd 1935, 
London 1935 s Protokol VII. Sjezdu Komunistické strany Československa, 11–14. 4. 1936, 
Prague 1967, pp. 38–43, 48–52. Regarding the idea understanding of Fascism within the 
British Communist movement see also Rajani Palme Dutt, Fascism and Social Revolution, 
London 1934.
53 Cf. NA Prague, f. ÚV KSČ, krajské oddělení Praha, b. 4, Oběžník krajského vedení obvod-
ním vedením KSČ (1936); A. Thorpe, The British Communist Party, pp. 191–250, or M. Da-
vis, Comrade or Brother?, pp. 214. Regarding the life of Oswald Mosley and the history of 
BUF see for example Jakub Drábik, Fašista. Příběh sira Oswalda Mosleyho, Prague 2017. 
54 Cf. Richard: Baxell, British Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War. The British Battalion in the 
International Brigades, 1936–1939, London — New York 2004, pp. 9, 15 with Jiří Nedvěd, 
“Verbování” československých dobrovolníků do mezinárodních brigád a jejich cesty do 




prising in view of the general mechanisms of functioning of the international Com-
munist movement. However, one cannot infer from it an explanation for the relative 
success of CPC nor does it explain the causes of CPGB’s marginalisation. The British 
Communists offered their members, sympathisers and voters nationalisation, radical 
redistribution of income, and, in the short term, a radical increase in state spending 
on social policy.55 They did not differ from CPC in their resistance to the bourgeoisie. 
The question remains, however, what social pillars maintained the stability of British 
society and, conversely, what factors increased the demand for the type of political 
representation of the anti-systemic Communist movement in Czechoslovakia. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL FIELD AS A KEY  
TO THE INTEGRATION OF THE WORKING CLASS INTO SOCIETY
From the end of the 19th to the mid-20th century, a crisis unfolded in the modernisa-
tion process in Europe, which triggered a transition from liberal to organised form of 
modernity. One of the most pressing societal themes that necessitated this shift was 
the emancipation and integration of lower strata into a wider society.56 In nation so-
cieties across the western civilisation circle, in various variants, the workers’ move-
ment evolved to create a political representation. Since the 1970s, Social Democrats 
associated in the Second International have established themselves through the de-
mocratisation of electoral law to participate in central political power and to create 
institutions conducive to the effective transformation of existing class-differentiated 
societies into socially more just ones.57 The legally active political parties and trade 
unions became the key institutional tools to increase the potential of the workforce as 
part of the negotiation of a consensus across society. The Communist movement was 
created by subsequent divisions of such organisations, and endeavoured to offer al-
ternative answers to questions in which the established reformist movement failed.58
As late arrivals, the new Communist organisations had to be incorporated into an 
already functioning system of political parties. Their success depended to some ex-
tent on the breadth of the political field that they could offer. The British Communist 
Party had to fight for its inclusion in a bipartisan system, in which the Labour Party 
55 Draft Programme of the CPGB. To the Comintern, The Communist Review, June 1924, 
Vol. 5, No. 2.
56 Peter Wagner, Sociology of Modernity. Liberty and Discipline, London — New York 2003, 
pp. 55–69.
57 For the history of the 2nd International see for example James Joll, The Second Internation-
al 1889–1914, New York 1966. For the pan-European shift resulting in integration of the 
workers’ movement into the political systems of European societies see for example Mi-
chael Rapport, Evropa devatenáctého století, Prague, 2005, pp. 286–307.
58 As already suggested, the main failure of the Second Internationale was support for the 
war cabinets after the declaration of World War One. Moreover, the Communist move-
ment had a strong symbolic representation in the form of a successful revolution and a vi-




was pushing out the Liberals, the party with the majority.59 The emergence of the La-
bour Party as a political party can be considered as a demonstration of the formation 
of institutional instruments capable of incorporating the working class into the other 
society. By the turn of the 20th century the growing trade union organisations and 
their influence triggered a reaction from the British employers who began to form 
industrial unions in an effort to maintain a balance in negotiations. Disputes between 
labour and capital began to impinge on the political plane. The union leaders entered 
the political field after using the organisational platform of the workers’ organisa-
tions and brought them together in a single political entity, the Labour Party. After 
the First World War, this party, armed with the ideological tools of reformist Fabian 
Socialism, grew rapidly. The Labour Party offered to their voters a policy statement, 
The New Social Order, written by Sydney Webb, a minimum wage, full employment, 
nationalisation of key industries, and a higher degree of redistribution of national 
income.60 In this extremely leftist document the long-term goals of the Labour Party 
and CPGB overlapped. The political rivals only differed in the preferred ways of their 
achievement.
The bipartisan system created the rules for political competition framed by a ma-
jority electoral system that pushed voters and individual politicians to seek to promote 
particular class interests through major strong political parties.61 Maurice Duvergere 
expressed the basic mechanism of the functioning of the bipartite system as follows: 
“Parliamentary power is an element of the electoral force. Voters will come to the fact 
that they throw away their voices when they give them a party that disadvantages elec-
toral technology. Polarisation triggered in the public by a one-round majority system 
proves this clearly.”62 The British Communists, with their commitment to zero toler-
ance towards the Labour Party, who have approved the 21 conditions of the Communist 
International, now faced the difficult task of persuading the majority of the rank-
and-file members and sympathisers of the Labour Party that CPGB was the sole rep-
resentative of their class interests.63 Failure to do so meant complete marginalisation. 
The field of Czechoslovak politics was built naturally after the establishment of 
the republic. Within the emerging multiparty system, a number of political par-
ties were established, and the proportional electoral system allowed them to gain 
their own stable electorate.64 The notional political field has conservatism/liberal-
ism and the left/right-wing partisans divided into a number of sub-fields occupied 
by individual political parties. In spite of the fact that real power policy took place 
59 Ross McKibbin, Parties and People. England 1914–1951. The Ford Lectures delivered in the 
University of Oxford in Hilary Term 2008, Oxford 2011, pp. 33–68.
60 Henry Pelling, A Short History of the Labour Party, London 1985, pp. 44–45.
61 As for the British interwar electoral system see D. E. Butler, The Electoral System in Brit-
ain 1918–1951, Oxford 1953.
62 Maurice Duvergere, Politické strany, Prague 2016, p. 308.
63 Vladimir I. Lenin, Terms of Admission into Communist Internationale. In: Lenin’s Collect-
ed Works Vol. 31, Moscow 1965, pp. 206–211.





in a regime of cartel divisions between the parties stably involved in governmen-
tal coalitions, it allowed this system to form a stable position not only by a systemic 
but also a non-systemic political movement. In the parliamentary elections, it was 
normal for up to 30 political parties to take part. The Communist Party of Czecho-
slovakia acted within a  system of partisanship characterised by the progressive 
segmenting of public life. This was building of party-political blocs, whose or-
ganisational apparatus provided for almost the entire spectrum of social needs of 
their members.65 These blocs rested on their members’ confidence in the possibil-
ity of party representation influencing the political life of the country. The ability 
to participate in power defined a party’s ability to delegate its members to offices 
from the lowest to the highest level. The fact that CPC had 41 deputies in the Lower 
Chamber of the National Assembly in 1925 was a clear declaration of its ability to 
give voice to supporters in the plenum of top-level political decision-making.66 Al-
though the opposition did not allow the Communists to take part in power and elimi-
nated them from the parties’ power cartel, the space for parliamentary speeches 
and interpellations allowed them to show the voters that the idea of a social change 
was constantly being promoted. A vote for the Communist Party in the electoral 
contest was not wasted, to employ Duverger’s metaphor, and, on the contrary, it 
gained in value in the sense of articulation of a protest against the ruling order.
Whereas in the bipartisan system of British politics, only the Labour Party could 
aspire to be the party with a majority mission in the left sector of the political field, 
the National Socialists, Social Democrats and Communists established themselves 
successfully in the Czechoslovak multiparty system from the centre to the radical 
left. This fact fundamentally influenced the approach of sympathisers with a radical 
leftist policy towards the hegemonic political parties. The members of the Marxist left 
within the Social Democracy initiated a complete party split, without provoking a cri-
sis of the Czechoslovak left as a whole. This created a situation in which the newly 
formed Communist Party and the original Social Democrats became equal opponents 
in the struggle for the voters’ favour. The multiparty system offered them enough 
space to do so. Conversely, the process of creating CPGB by merging several circles 
of radical Marxists did not endanger the existing Labour Party structures. A clear 
division of this party was out of the question. These system frameworks set out the 
limits of the rivalry of revolutionary Marxism with a revolutionary policy, both in 
the Czechoslovak milieu and in Britain.
65 About the nature of the proportioning of pollical power and segmentation of public life 
in Czechoslovakia see Peter Heumos, Strukturální prvky první Československé republiky, 
Soudobé dějiny 2, 1995.
66 A total of 300 deputies sat in the Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies. In this context, the 
Communist deputies were legitimised by their majority adhesion to the working class. In 
addition, it showed the possibilities for social advance through the CPC structures. See Jo-
sef Harna, Profesní a věková struktura členů poslanecké sněmovny Národního shromáž-
dění z období první Československé republiky (Příspěvek k typologii politických stran). 
In: Josef Harna a Petr Prokš (eds.), Studie k moderním dějinám: sborník prací k 70. naro-




The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, immediately after its founding, went 
into a confrontation with the Social Democrats, accusing them of betrayal of the 
working class and active participation in the preparations for World War One. The 
periodical of CPC youth organisation associated them with fascism as early as 1923: 
“This success of the Communist Party is the most dangerous, especially for the con-
structive Czech Social Democrats, who are the mainstay of the bourgeois, fascist 
coalition, and at a given moment they will become the support of an openly fascist 
government.”67 Although the Communist Party of Great Britain employed at the pro-
clamatory level a strongly critical vocabulary, one of the important decisions taken 
by its leadership was to take Lenin’s advice about the need to associate CPGB with the 
Labour Party.68 Critics who did not want to negotiate with the Labour Party or even 
considered participation in the parliamentary system to be too important a conces-
sion to the system were simply expelled from the party.69 Lenin evidently realised 
the systemic pressures on the British political scene, and convinced the hesitant 
key figures of the young party in private talks in Moscow that they should lead the 
party to an organisational link with the Labour Party and the closely related trade 
unions.70
While for the Czechoslovak Communists the Social Democracy became a pillar of 
the establishment due to its active participation in governmental coalitions, CPGB 
took a schizophrenic attitude towards the Labour Party.71 The Party programme of-
fered readers a vision of a “flexible policy”: “The Communist attitude towards the 
Labour Party is not necessarily a static one [...] Communist tactics are always gov-
erned by reference to changing conditions and adapted to meet new situations as they 
emerge [...] the Communist as a result, the Party, while striving against the reformist 
policy and reactionary leadership of the Labour Party, does not oppose that Party, 
as it is a genuine working class party, but seeks affiliation to the Labour Party, hold-
ing that it is the duty of the Communists to work in and through the middle of all 
genuine working class organisations [...] the Communist Party, while attacking reac-
tionary politics and leadership, must support all genuine proletarian tendencies and 
elements within the Labour Party and seek to give those a Communist direction.”72 
The first CPGB request for affiliation was dismissed by the Labour Party. The Commu-
nists sought to use the rejection in the context of their hypercritical public criticism 
67 Komunistická mládež, August 1923.
68 J. Klugmann, History of the Communist Party, pp. 13–236. 
69 For example, the feminist activist and pacifist Sylvia Pankhurst left CPGB. See James 
Eaden — David Renton, The Communist Party of Great Britain since 1920, New York, 
2002, p. 9.
70 A. Thorpe, The British Communist Party, pp. 19–32; F. Beckett, Enemy Within, p. 16.
71 The CPC representatives criticised the Social Democrats for their inconsistent, soft, even 
opportunist stance on the “bourgeoisie” and their overlooking of social inequality leading 
to support for “Czech Fascism”. See for example Protokol II. řádného sjezdu Komunistické 
strany Československa 31. 10. — 4. 11. 1924, Prague 1983, p. 365; Protokol IV. řádného sjez-
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levelled at a hegemonic competitor based on its reluctance to support the political 
unification of the working class.73
The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia did not merely succeed in defeating the 
Social Democrats in in the 1925 parliamentary elections; it was outdistanced from the 
overall leadership by only half a percentage point.74 On the other hand, the British 
Communists, in 1924, watched the formation of the first Labour government without 
any greater influence in Parliament. The party leaders apparently realised that their 
side was reined in by the bipartite system and incorporated into their programme in 
1929 the demand to change the electoral system from majority to proportional.75 In 
1924, their election campaign policy was based on clear support for the Labour Party 
and described its participation in the government coalition as undisputable progress 
in building class consciousness of the members of the British working class.76 This 
obliging move towards respect for the bipartisan system resulted even in socially ex-
cluded mining areas and well-known CPGB bastions called Little Moscows in local 
electors in municipal elections and workers’ union elections preferring local Com-
munist leaders but in parliamentary elections supporting Labour.77 The leadership 
of CPGB even voiced its support for the Labour government so loudly that it played 
down the criticism branding them in the discourse as traitors of the working class, 
for which it was criticised by the Comintern.78 
An analogous situation existed at the level of the trade unions and policies of the 
Communist parties in the workplaces. CPC and CPGB declared in concert that the 
top priority for their movement was to successfully penetrate the factories and ef-
fectively organise the workers. For this purpose, the party organisations should serve 
as the basis for the local organisational structure of both parties and trade unions 
working under the ideological leadership of the Red Trade Union International.79 In 
Czechoslovakia, the trade unions became constituents of the political and social pil-
lars supporting the political parties. All political movements with aspirations to rep-
resent the class interests of the workers, from the National Socialists to the Commu-
nists, created their own trade union. The most powerful entity in the pluralist trade 
73 The Communist Party and the Labour Party. All the Facts and All the Correspondence, Lon-
don [192-?].
74 For the parliamentary election in 1925 see Zdeněk Kárník, České země v éře První repub-
liky, Bd. I, Vznik, budování a zlatá léta republiky (1918–1929), Prague 2000, pp. 370–382.
75 Class Against Class. General Election Programme of the Communist Party of Great Brit-
ain, London 1929.
76 Communist Parliamentary Policy and Electoral Programme, London 1922, pp. 5–6, and 
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ruary 1924.
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Britain, London 1980, p. 180.
78 See A. Thorpe, The British Communist Party, pp. 75–82.
79 Cf. NA Prague, f. ÚV KSČ, krajské oddělení Praha, b. 1, Návrh organizačního řádu KSČ 
prováděcího ustanovení. Pro delegáty IV. sjezdu KSČ; Draft: Constitution of the Commu-





union system remained the Czechoslovak Trade Union Association (OSC) with close 
ideological and personal ties to Social Democracy, from which the Communist Inter-
national All-Trade Union Association (IAUA) divided by splitting. The fission process 
proceeded similarly at the party level. Following an unsuccessful attempt by the Left 
faction to dominate the OSC leadership, the radicals were expelled and established 
their own entity. Of the individual social-democratic professional associations, up to 
30% of the membership left.80 Negotiations during labour and capital disputes at the 
local level took place on the basis of the creation of short-term coalitions between 
workers’ leaders organised in individual trade unions, and only then by negotiations 
with the employers.
The British trade union movement, on the other hand, was a single, centrally man-
aged organisation led at the highest level of the Trade Union Congress. Within the 
framework of the war economy, British trade union leaders were given an opportunity 
to participate, together with government representatives and business owners, in the 
management of industries. The postwar crisis accelerated the process of centralising 
the British unions. In the first half of the 20th century, two mammoth trade union were 
established: Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) and National Union of 
General and Municipal Workers (NUGMW). In 1926, General Labour Workers Union 
brought together 27 trade union congresses in different industrial sectors. The bar-
gaining potential of the British trade unions was enhanced by the formation of strong 
alliances of these centralised institutions that were able to put pressure not only on the 
owners but also on the central government. The Triple Alliance played a central role 
in the postwar wave of strikes and unrest, and the 1926 general strike was led by the 
General Council.81 By their nature, the institutional approaches to the solution of the 
dispute between labour and capital copied the structure of the bipartite system of the 
structuring political field. Negotiations were conducted between a united organisation 
of workers, linked personally and organisationally, with its political representation in 
the Labour Party and representatives of capital in sympathy with the conservatives. 
Whereas the Czechoslovak form of the working-class representation in the public 
space had a characteristic tendency of splitting along the lines of particular interests 
of the individual segments of workers, for the actors in the British bipartisan reality 
the disunity was a fundamental threat. Both the Labour Party and the Trade Union 
Congress functioned as an umbrella, bringing together various political and organ-
isational actors who preferred a radically different solution. While in the unions the 
source of radicalism was the rank-and-file movement leaning on shop stewards, in 
the Labour Party the radical wing was active in the Independent Labour Party, the 
British Socialist Party, and the Socialist League. The British Socialist Party, with the 
ambition to create a completely independent platform, broke away from the Labour 
80 As for the form of trade union organisation in interwar Czechoslovakia see František 
Čapka, Odbory v českých zemích v letech 1918–1948, Brno 2008, pp. 65–134, and Josef 
Kotek, Odborové hnutí zaměstnanců, Prague 1930.
81 See Chris Wrigley, The Trade Unions Between the Wars.In: A History of British Industri-





Party, but in 1914 it faced marginalisation and sought a way to re-affiliation.82 The 
number of factions within these large organisations caused tensions and attempts to 
question the decisions of the central organs. These pressures, however, were attenu-
ated to maintain unity. While the Czechoslovak Communists had an opportunity to 
defeat their rivals in the struggle for leadership in the representation of the work-
ing class, the British Communists only hoped to maximise their participation in the 
workings of the Labour Party and trying to transform it from within. The fact that 
the Communists had a certain potential for destabilising the Labour Party is sub-
stantiated by the general strike events. In 1925, when reaching the highest level of 
consensus was becoming increasingly difficult, the Labour Party’s congress decided 
to deny the right to individual membership in the Labour Party to Communists who 
held both the CPGB and the Labour Party card.83 The ability of the Communists to 
inflame the situation before and during the general strike was not underestimated 
by the state security forces which reacted by arresting almost all the party leadership 
and persecuting radical orators during the strike.84
A significant shift in the movements of the two Communist parties in the po-
litical fields of individual national societies was the application of the thesis about 
social-fascism in the late 1920s, overlapping with the eruption of the Great Depres-
sion. The Social Democrats and the National Socialists opened up new opportunities 
for criticism of the Communist Party, which deepened the steadily critical discourse 
towards its rivals. Identified with the government circles, the Social Democrats were 
branded by the Communists as the main bearers of fascism: “The Social-Fascists sit 
in the government and have their snouts in the trough because they defend the dom-
ination of capital against the proletariat. The Communists are persecuted and rot in 
prisons because they lead the proletariat in the struggle against the domination of 
capital.”85 The radical generational change in the Communist Party described above 
consisted of the ideological axiom of party cleansing itself of the legacy of the Social 
Democracy. The rigid application of the thesis about social-fascism was a clear prior-
ity for the party’s leadership, notwithstanding the isolation in which CPC gradually 
found itself, and was maintained with the help of the elimination of party dissent, 
pointing to the inability of this doctrine to mobilise a sufficient force against the 
growing importance of the fascist movements.86 
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The failure of the Labour Party to solve the problems caused by the Great Depres-
sion reflected the practice of its functioning as an institutional umbrella. The issue 
of unemployment generated further tension between the central party leadership 
and the Independent Labour Party offering Keynesian recipes for tackling the crisis. 
In realistic politics, the Labour Party’s steps were based on orthodox economic tools 
typical of the right.87 Strengthening of the inner scission line led to expulsion of the 
whole Independent Labour Party in 1932.88 But, the Communists were unable to make 
use of this suggestion of a rift in the Labour Party because they were restrained by 
policy application by resolutely refusing to cooperate with any version of reform-
ism. Although CPGB’s criticism of the Labour Party was not based on a vocabulary as 
radical as that used by CPC, it could be said that this was a clear move for which the 
CPGB leaders had acquired imaginary ammunition after the strike was called off by 
the Trade Union Council. In the congress proceedings the new party line came to the 
following conclusion: “Later, after the first meeting, the main programme of the re-
formists was focused on the reconstruction and stabilisation of declining capitalism, 
which industrial peace advocates hope to achieve.”89 The opposition role of the Labour 
Party in 1925–1929 was described by CPGB as direct collaboration with Stanley Bald-
win’s conservative cabinet leading to betrayal of the striking workers in 1926, support 
for the imperialistic policy, and even protests against the Chinese Revolution.90
A turnaround in the direction of reuniting the Communists with their reformist 
rivals came with the application of the unified front tactics in the mid-1930s. For the 
CPGB representatives, the practical pursuance of the new policy involved an attempt 
to affiliate with the Labour Party, which was again rejected.91 The leadership of the 
Communist Party decided to take a similar step by starting a discussion with the So-
cial Democrats about a future merger of the two parties.92 The struggle for a united 
front was not wholly successful in Britain or in Czechoslovakia. While CPGB activists 
blocked streets and engaged in violent clashes with the British Union of Fascists, the 
Labour Party shied away from such a style of political leadership and tried to fight 
against fascism at the parliamentary level. However, many local Labour Party par-
ties decided to endorse the anti-fascist CPGB actions, and a certain form of a united 
87 M. Perry, Bread and Work, pp. 83–86.
88 M. Davis, Comrade or Brother?, pp. 210–213. 
89 The New Line. Documents of the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of Great Britain 
held at Bermondsey, London on Jan. 19th–22nd 1929, London 1929, p. 16.
90 Reg Groves, Four Years of Labour “Opposition”. A Communist Examination of the Labour 
Party’s Record in the House of Commons from 1925 to 1929, London 1929.
91 Concerning the principles of the Unified Front laid down by the CPGB see The Programme 
of the Communist Party adopted at the XIII Congress 2 February 1935, London 1935. As 
for the failure of the affiliation talks see J. Eaden — D. Renton, The Communist Party, 
pp. 53–55.
92 Vítězslav Sommer, Revoluce nebo spolupráce?: KSČ a  otázka sjednocení levice před 
VII. kongresem Kominterny 1934–1935. In: Zdeněk Kárník — Jiří Kocian — Jaroslav Pa-
žout — Jakub Rákosník (eds.), Bolševismus, komunismus a radikální socialismus v Česko-




front was created from below.93 A similar effect had a change in the CPC policy, which 
ceased to designate as the main source of fascism the Social Democracy and regarded 
it as an external threat.94 Both political entities were forced by the threat of war to 
make effective unifying efforts. 
It is evident that the structure of the political field had a significant influence on 
the success or marginalisation of the two Communist movements. However, a coun-
terfactual reflection on a scenario involving the mass indoctrination of the Labour 
Party’s grassroots by a Marxist doctrine spread by the British Communists brings us 
to the question of why CPGB was unable to significantly influence the living world of 
the workers. The penetration of Communist activists into the community life of the 
workers dependent on family relations, local ties and friendship proved much more 
successful in Czechoslovakia than in Britain.95 The reasons for these differences can-
not be deduced from the structure of the political field, and it is necessary to capture 
the function of the notional symbolic pillars of society in the distribution of oppor-
tunities for social advancement and collective representations. 
THE EMPIRE AND THE CROWN AS A SYMBOL OF STABILITY  
VERSUS THE WEAKNESS OF MASARYK’S CULT
The stability of British society was based, among other things, on Britain’s power po-
sition within the Western world. The Empire, which was in its heyday during the 
postwar peace talks, had a notable function in distributing opportunities for social 
advancement in the British Isles and became a collective representation of the British 
system’s strength. Metaphorically speaking, it was an outlet for releasing social ten-
sion outside of the political centre. Maintenance of the bureaucratic apparatus and 
naval power offered people with inconsistent social status enough opportunities to 
migrate and lead a new life in different parts of the world.96 Between 1920 and 1929, 
1 185 952 people departed from Britain to live in the Empire or in the USA. Between 
93 M. Davis, Comrade or Brother?, p. 214; F. Beckett, Enemy Within, pp. 60–64.
94 See for example Gottwald’s speech delivered at the 7th Party Congress: Protokol VII. Sjez-
du Komunistické strany Československa, 11.–14.4.1936, Prague 1967, pp. 38–43, 48–52.
95 The Communists only succeeded on the local level in selected areas. See S. Macintyre, 
Little Moscows. Key study on the social practice of KSČ penetrating the poor districts in 
Prague see B. Melichar, Rudá Praha. pp. 146–165. For similarities in the everyday function-
ing of the Czechoslovak and British working-class communities cf. R. McKibbin, Classes 
and Cultures, pp. 100, 207, 235–269, 106–205 with S. Holubec, Lidé periferie. 
96 For the sociological theory of inconsistent social status see Jadwiga Šanderová, Sociální 
stratifikace, Prague, 2004, p. 75. Career opportunities were in the bureaucratic appara-
tus of the imperial administration and the army necessary to defend the occupied terri-
tories. As for options for members of the working class making their mark in the British 
army see Nicholas Mansfield, Exploited Workers or Agents of Imperialism? British Com-
mon Soldiers in the Nineteenth Century. In: Billy Frank, Craig Horner and David Stewart 




1915 and 1930 18.7 million Britons left Europe.97 The effect of a social outlet in relation 
to imperialism was described by Hannah Arendt as an alliance between capital and 
the mob: “The people who became permanently unemployed were for society as su-
perfluous as owners of superfluous capital. During the nineteenth century they were 
aware that these unemployed were a real threat to society, and their exports helped 
the people of Canada, Australia and the United States [...] gold-diggers, adventurers 
and the urban poor emigrated to the Black Continent together with capital from in-
dustrially developed countries. From now on, the mob created by the massive accu-
mulation of capital accompanied the creators on exploratory journeys during which 
nothing but investment opportunities were discovered.”98 It should not be forgotten 
that the movement of the population was not one-way. In the interwar period, migra-
tion of colonial populations into the centre of the Empire increased, and the collec-
tive representation of the open world helped to maintain a generally shared consen-
sus in the British Isles. Stuart McIntyre describes his studies on Communist mining 
enclaves in several cases of emigration of local Communist leaders to more favour-
able regions of Great Britain or the Empire or the United States to avoid discrimina-
tion on the part of employers.99 Alternative possibilities of career advancement could 
satisfy the potential dissent or at least filter it out to the periphery. 
The imperial possessions offered citizens not only opportunities for migration, 
but also, figuratively speaking, they were able to feed them. An economy based on un-
fair exchanges of raw materials and finished products allowed the British heavy and 
textile industry to flourish. Imperial expansion thus raised the living standards of the 
workers in Britain proper. Only in the combination of the idea of an open world and 
the creation of jobs in the mother country can we understand the well-known notion 
of Cecil Rhodes, who claimed that in order to save the United Kingdom from a bloody 
civil war, it must acquire new lands for settling its surplus population and provid-
ing new markets. This notion became an indirect definition of social imperialism.100 
The growing economic independence of the key British colonies, however, meant 
a change in the functioning of the market, plunging these sectors in the interwar 
period into a grave crisis that led to the intensified activities of the trade unionists 
in 1926.101 Yet, the economic importance of the Empire, as demonstrated by the Great 
97 Marjory Harper — Stephen Constantine, Migration and Empire, Oxford 2010, pp. 2–10.
98 Hannah Arendt, Původ totalitarismu, Bd. I-III, Prague 1996, p. 235.
99 S. Macintyre, Little Moscows, pp. 99, 106.
100 For the Communist movement Lenin’s theory of social imperialism was most influential. 
See Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Prague 1949, 
pp. 74–75. The concept of social imperialism was returned to modern historiography by 
the Bielefeld School and subsequent debate about the Sonderweg concept. See for exam-
ple Jürgen Kocka, German history before Hitler: The debate about the German Sonderweg, 
Journal of Contemporary history, Vol. 23, January 1988, and Geoff Eley, Defining Social Im-
perialism: Use and Abuse of an Idea, Social History, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Oct. 1976). 
 See Kevin Hjortshøj O’Rourke, From Empire to Europe: Britain in the world economy. In: 
Roderick Floud, Jane Humphries and Paul Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic His-
tory of Modern Britain, Volume II., 1870 to the Present, Cambridge 2014.




Depression, was not altogether diminished. In the ongoing protectionist economic 
war between the individual Western economies, the most-favoured-nation clause 
within the Empire allowed the markets for British merchandise to expand by leaps 
and bounds.102 By its global nature, however, the Great Depression brought about the 
fundamental problems of the stability mechanism based on the open world. The wave 
of unemployment reached both the US and the countries of the British Empire. The 
existential problems of the unemployed, whom the system could not absorb, cre-
ated a protest potential that the British Communists could exploit. Mass demonstra-
tions and hunger marches showed a blind spot in the integration of the working class 
through Imperial rule and the bipartisan political system. The consequences of the 
Great Depression in the form of the mass of the unemployed living in the streets of 
the British cities and the hungry farmers in the imperial system highlighted the fis-
sion lines and became a watershed in the history of the British Empire.103 
In the interwar period, however, the Empire still functioned as a collective repre-
sentation of the strength and stability of the country. The British Empire Exhibition 
held in 1924, which became a popular celebration of global British success, was visited 
by more than 20 million Britons.104 While scepticism about the Imperial project was 
growing in intellectual circles, the press, radio and film spread its original symbolic 
mission, described by Eric Hobsbawm as follows: “[...] generally, imperialism has en-
couraged the masses, and especially the potentially discontent, to identify themselves 
with the imperial state and nation, and so unconsciously to endow the social and 
political system represented by that state with justification and legitimacy.”105 From 
this, Mary Davis developed the thesis that the British Empire was the cause of identi-
fication of the British working class with the social reform policy of the Liberals and 
later the Labour Party.106
102 For Britain, for tackling this crisis the Ottawa Conference in 1932 was vital as it agreed 
minimum customs duties throughout the Empire and a single high customs tariffs for the 
competition in areas outside the interests of the Crown. For the customs war triggered by 
the new wave of protectionism in the 1930s see Jakub Rákosník — Jiří Noha, Kapitalismus 
na kolenou: dopad velké hospodářské krize na evropskou společnost v letech 1929–1934, 
Prague 2012, pp. 147–168.
103 Eric Hobsbawm interpreted the sharp drop in the prices of raw materials and commercial 
crops as a special circumstance for the formation of a political alliance between the elites 
of the subject countries and the general populations that led in many places (for example, 
in India) to the creation of a mass national movement. See Eric Hobsbawm, Věk extrémů. 
Krátké 20. století 1914–1991, Prague 1998, pp. 223–224.
104 Niall Ferguson, Britské impérium. Cesta k modernímu světu, Prague 2007, pp. 335–343.
105 Eric J. Hobsbawn, The Age of Empire 1875–1914, New York 1989, pp. 69–73.
106 M. Davis, Comrade or Brother?, p. 157. A similar thesis is advanced by Geoffrey Field. See 
Geoffrey Field, Social Patriotism and the British Working Class: Appearance and Disap-
pearance of a Tradition. In: International Labour and Working-Class History, No. 42, Tra-
dition and the Working Class (August 1992), p. 22. Ross McKibbin holds that the influence 
of imperialism is a factor that caused the British workers to have reservations regarding 
Marxism. See Ross McKibbin, Why There is No Marxism in Great Britain?, English His-




An apt metaphor for the reality of Czechoslovak society is that of a pressure cook-
er.107 Although the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was a large empire before the First 
World War, it lacked overseas possessions, and the ruling circles could not exploit 
the size of the state to provide favourable opportunities for potential dissent. The 
increasingly influential nationalist movements created alternative elites as they had 
become an institutional instrument able to offer a vision of the future to individuals 
experiencing the most life’s difficulties with an inconsistent social status. The Czech 
National Movement for Language Equality and then for complete independence can 
be interpreted as an expression of the Czech language middle-class struggle for rec-
ognition, career opportunities and participation in power.108 The monarchy, however, 
lacked an outlet that would filter out this class conflict, and all of its energy was di-
rected against the central government. In the early 20th century the Czech working 
class organised in the Social Democracy was split between Marxist class identity and 
national identity, resulting in the projection of the vision of a socially just world into 
the reality of a future independent state.109 
The breakup of Austria-Hungary in 1918 meant the creation of Czechoslovakia as 
an independent state. This founding act can be perceived as an accomplishment of 
the efforts of a hundred years in the national movement, which in its mass phase in-
tegrated all the social strata and their political representation. However, the national 
unity and cooperation between all the political entities, as manifested in the work 
of the National Committee in October 1918, began to come apart rapidly. The vari-
ous components of the national movement were beginning to pursue their visions 
and trying to get the greatest possible share of power. An unarmed struggle began 
over the nature of the Republic, which eventually led to the emergence of the already 
mentioned power cartel at the level of government policy. At the symbolic level, the 
collective representation of stability was to be the charismatic leader of the national 
movement, the First President Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. 
Masaryk, as the leader who secured the nation’s own independent state, was to 
become a generally recognised authority figure.110 The image of a wise, elderly yet 
vigorous professor was to become the collective representation of the young Repub-
lic. A modest, equanimous and highly principled man with a perfectly harmonious 
107 Advancing globalisation with increasing global migration naturally affected the Czech 
Lands and by extension Czechoslovakia. Unlike the Britons, however, the Czech migra-
tion was limited by the language barrier and the absence of a possibility for appointing 
middle-class malcontents to the Imperial administration. As for migration of Czechs to 
different parts of the world see Jaroslav Vaculík, Češi v cizině 1850–1938, Brno 2009.
108 As for the concept of the nation as an alternative elite movement see Miroslav Hroch, 
V národním zájmu: požadavky a cíle evropských národních hnutí devatenáctého století 
ve srovnávací perspektivě, Prague 1999. 
109 As for the relation between national identity and class identity within the prewar Social 
Democratic movement see Jakub S. Beneš, Workers and Nationalism. Czech and German 
Social Democracy in Habsburg Austria, 1890–1918, Oxford 2017.
110 Regarding Masaryk’s life story see for example Alain Soubigou, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, 
Prague 2004; see also Andrea Orzoff, Battle for the Castle. The Myth of Czechoslovakia in 




personal life was presented as a model to all the social strata. A professor who worked 
his way up from a humble background, portrayed with equal elegance at military 
parades mounted on his white horse or sitting at his desk, was to become a personifi-
cation of the state. The president occupied an exclusive position in the public space. 
His birthday celebrations were to become manifestations of a national society con-
sensually recognising the president’s political merits and his personal qualities.111 
The importance of this man at the level of symbolic representations, maintaining the 
social consensus, clearly underlined the successful attempt of the constructive po-
litical representation to embody Masaryk’s cult in the Collection of Laws. On his 80th 
birthday, the following law was passed: “T.G. Masaryk deserves credit for the creation 
of the State. This statement will be eternally hewn in stone in both Chambers of the 
National Assembly.”112
We can view the building of Masaryk’s cult as a collective representation of the 
stability of the Czechoslovak Republic, perceived analogously to the symbolic mean-
ing of the British sovereign. The image of the royal family was shaped through new 
mass media, as was the image of the British Empire as a whole. The sovereign’s private 
life, cosmopolitan outlook, and the political role of the unifier who managed to steer 
clear of controversial issues dividing society, all of this made the King a collective 
representation of a basic consensus superior to particular collective interests.113 Both 
the Czechoslovak president and the British Royal Family were to be a class-neutral 
representation of national ideas. The British Communists attempted to attack the ba-
sic pillars of British society’s stability from their anti-systemic position. To them, the 
existence of the Empire certainly did not exemplify the size of Britain; on the con-
trary, they claimed it was a tool to make a profit from the work of British labourers 
to be channelled to armaments, the army and wars of aggression waged in order to 
subjugate an increasing number of workers around the world, a tool for corrupting 
the weak class of British skilled workers and hiding the overall repressive nature 
111 See T.G. Masaryk. Rukověť pořadatelům oslav jeho narozenin, Prague 1926; T.G. Ma-
saryk. Rukověť pořadatelům oslav jeho 75. narozenin, Prague 1925 and President Ma-
saryk. K Jubileu sedmdesátých narozenin, Prague [1930]. The president’s life story was 
present in public space thanks to an influential book by Karel Čapek who took downs 
his memories. The memoirs began to be published in 1928. See Karel Čapek and Tomáš 
Garrigue Masaryk, Hovory s T. G. Masarykem. Věk mladosti, Prague 1928; Karel Čapek 
and Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Hovory s T. G. Masarykem. Život práce, Prague 1931; Karel 
Čapek and Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Hovory s T.G. Masarykem. Myšlení a život, Prague 
1935; see also Dagmar Hájková, “Dokud člověk jí klobásy, tak neumře.” Oslavy narozenin 
T. G. Masaryka. In: Dagmar Hájková — Luboš Velek (eds.), Historik nad šachovnicí dějin. 
K pětasedmdesátinám Jana Galandauera. Prague 2011, pp. 218–235. 
112 Act of 26 February 1930 on the meritorious work of T.G. Masaryk, Collection of Laws and 
Ordinances of the Czechoslovak State, 6. 3. 1930, p. 55. For the pollitical and social con-
tent of the passing of the Act see for example Z. Kárník, České země v éře První republiky, 
Vol. II, pp. 70–72.





of the system.114 In their policy statement, they offered the voters abolition of mon-
archy and hereditary titles.115 The strength of these two stabilising elements of the 
British Society illustrates the marginalisation of CPGB on the British political scene. 
The Czechoslovak Communists were much more successful with their anti-system 
discourse.
It should be noted that the building of Masaryk’s cult met with a certain response 
in Czechoslovak society and the working class was not immune to this symbolic com-
munication. This is suggested by a sociological-pedagogical poll carried out among 
Prague apprentices, who named Masaryk most often in a questionnaire about their 
life paragon.116 Masaryk’s legacy was strongly accentuated by the Czechoslovak Social 
Democrats whose ideologists included Masaryk among their idea sources for his in-
terpretation of Marx’s Capital.117 However, the image of the President of the Republic 
suffered from a weakness, the revolutionary origin of the newly established state. As 
the leader of the national movement Masaryk had to offer a vision of the future state 
and his rivals could easily criticise him as a political figure unable to deliver on his 
promises. 
The principal butt was the inability of the establishment to put into practice Ma-
saryk’s theoretical construction of a socialising democracy. In his book titled World 
Revolution he presented his vision as follows: “I am not against socialisation — sociali-
sation and not mere nationalisation or state oversight — in some sectors: I am for so-
cialising railways and means of communication in general, water, coal, etc.; I imagine 
socialisation as a gradual, developmental, prepared education of workers and people 
who manage production and exchange .... But, first and foremost, we must complete 
the incomplete social legislation, in particular, improve and standardise social insur-
ance, and more particularly, unemployment insurance.”118 The discrepancy between 
the reality of the Czechoslovak society in which class distinctions deepened as a re-
sult of the Great Depression and this vision exposed the president to leftist criticism. 
The Communist press certainly did not spare Masaryk: “…where are the promises of 
Masaryk that there would be neither poor nor rich people in the republic, that large 
estates, mines and factories would be expropriated...”119 Indirect evidence of the fact 
that in Czechoslovakia there was a demand for radical criticism of the central power, 
114 As for the criticism of imperialism by CPGB see for example Rajani Palme Dutt, Free the 
Colonies!, London 1931; Rajani Palme Dutt, Empire “socialism”, London 1925; The Colonial 
Question. A Study Syllabus for Workers, London [1931].
115 This demand appeared in the party programme in 1924 and in 1929. Draft Programme 
of the C.P.G.B. to the Comintern, The Communist Review, June 1924, Vol. 5, No. 2; Class 
Against Class. General Election Programme of the Communist Party of Great Britain, Lon-
don 1929.
116 S. Holubec, Lidé periferie, pp. 147–149.
117 As for the ideology of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats see Martin Polášek, Revizio nisté, 
progresivisté a tradicionalisté. Programové debaty v Československé sociální demokracii 
v letech 1924–1938, Brno 2013.
118 Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Světová revoluce, Prague 1927, p. 510.





and Masaryk’s cult may be the success of the Communist Party in the elections to the 
National Assembly in 1935. The party then garnered 849,509 votes and became the 
fourth largest party on the political scene despite its agitation during the presiden-
tial election in 1934, in which it had come up with the central campaign slogan, “Not 
Masaryk, but Lenin!”.120 
The concept of the events of October 1918 in the discourse of the Czechoslovak 
Communists as a stolen social revolution that was betrayed by the pro-government 
Social Democrats and left-wing reformist President Masaryk can be interpreted as 
a radical version of particular sectional interests embedded in the promise of the 
National Revolution. The instability of the so-called social and political institutions in 
Czechoslovak society thus contrasts with the British tradition of gradual institutional 
transformation. 
CONCLUSION
The outlined comparison of the development of the Czechoslovak and British Com-
munist Party highlights some elements of the historical process under examination 
and presents a new perspective for the exploration of Czechoslovak Communism. 
The theses explaining the success of CPC when compared with a very similar but 
unsuccessful project, on the one hand, are given more precise outlines and, on the 
other hand, they are distorted by comparisons so much that they can be presented 
for discussion to a wider field of scholars. The outlined identical ideological and tac-
tical development of both political entities places the very specific history of the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party in a wider framework of the interwar development 
of the international Communist movement. The emergence and success of the Com-
munist International as a whole depended on broader shifts in the mental horizon 
of Western society typical of the process of transition between liberal and organ-
ised modernity.
However, the chosen type of individualising comparative analysis places the dif-
ferences above the similarities in order to draw attention to the possible causes of the 
openness of the Czechoslovak society to the radical left-wing ideology. The classical 
Marxist social-critical theories counted on the deep roots of the success of the revo-
lutionary movement being deeply embedded in the organisation of social institutions 
in a broad sense, but their forecasts were based on a schematic causal relationship 
between the development of the economic base and the movement of the superstruc-
ture — the idea that the developed capitalist relations will lead to the strengthening 
of the Communist movement — proved to be inoperative. The surprising resistance 
of British society to the revolutionary CPGB project shifts the researcher’s attention 
to a different perspective.
120 As for the presidential election in 1935 see for example Zdeněk Kárník, KSČ — úspěchy 
a neúspěchy v klíčově významných parlamentních volbách v roce 1935. In: Zdeněk Kár-
ník and Michal Kopeček (eds.), Bolševismus, komunismus a radikální socialismus v Čes-




The factor that seems to be crucial in explaining the successful establishment of 
CPC in the political and wider social reality of Czechoslovakia is the revolutionary 
change of 1918. While the British bipartite structure of the political field can be in-
terpreted as a result of the gradual evolution of the system responding to various 
minor problems, the Czechoslovak multiparty system was an expression of the many 
expectations that individual elements of national society put into the future reality 
of an independent state. It was this multiplicity and the opposed vision of the future 
that led to the inability to reach a strong and stable consensus across society. Demo-
cratic environment of the emerging republic, which gave the opportunity to speak 
all competing programmes of the future development of the new state enabled the 
creation of not only systemic but also anti-systemic solutions. The fission line be-
tween the workers’ movement and the national identity that led to the state-building 
of the reformist representatives of the Social Democrats and the National Socialists 
and the consistent class identity forged by the revolutionaries from the Communist 
Party. The young Republic, ideologically standing on the ideas of the Czech national 
movement, lacked a supranational compromise leader, who could become a collective 
representation of stability. Masaryk’s cult was, on the way to this ideal, attacked by 
Communists who consistently described the President as a political personality with 
his own programme. While Britain was united by the majesty of the King, standing 
above all the particular interests and the blaze of the Imperial glory, which had not 
only a symbolic but also a practical function as a social outlet valve, the Czechoslo-
vak society suffered from a multitude of collective interests. The barriers to leaving 
Czechoslovakia were more complicated than migrating within the open Anglo-Saxon 
world and they increased the pressure to resolve disputed issues dividing the Czecho-
slovak society, and they became one of the factors causing a large part of the popula-
tion to demand a repetition of the autumn 1918 events with diametrically different 
results. 
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